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CASE COMMENTS
EXTENSION OF THE BASIS FOR STANDING IN
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
Parties adversely affected by the final decision of a federal admini-
strative agency often resort to federal courts in seeking judicial review
of the agency determination.' But in view of the number of adminis-
trative decisions rendered annually, it would be an undue burden for
the federal courts to undertake review of all or even most of the de-
cisions. 2 There must, therefore, be some means of selecting or limiting
judicial review to those parties who have a direct interest and who
can show a justiciable controversy. The troublesome problem of se-
lecting or limiting parties entitled to judicial review has resulted in
the rather complex federal doctrine of standing to secure judicial re-
view of agency action.
3
Recently, in National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. v. SEC,
4
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit held that an association representing members of the mutual fund
industry had standing to challenge action by the Comptroller of the
Currency granting certain fiduciary powers to national banks.5 The
grant of such fiduciary powers by the Comptroller6 enabled First Na-
tional City Bank (FNCB) to engage in the operation of a commingled
managing agency account 7 (Account), an activity in direct competition
'During the 1966 term more than one-fourth of all cases decided on the merits
by the Supreme Court were reviews of administrative actions-the largest single
category of the Court's work. Black, The Supreme Court-1966 Term, 81 HARv. L.
REv. 69, 128-29 (1967). One-third of all cases decided on the merits by the Supreme
Court in 1954-56 were reviews of administrative actions. Frankfurter, The Supreme
Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 781, 793 (1957).
2Approximately 80,140 formal proceedings for the determination of private
rights and duties were commenced before more than loo boards, commissions and
other governmental agencies during the fiscal year 196o. FINAL REPORT oF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 25 (1962).
3United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953). See generally
3 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATivE LAW TREATISE § 22.o (1958); Jaffe, Standing to Secure
Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1265, 1268 (1961).
'No. 20,164 (D.C. Cir., July 1, 1969), petitions for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3185
(U.S. Nov. io, 1969) (No. 835), (U.S. Nov. 12, 1969) (No. 843).
rIn 1962 Congress transferred power to regulate fiduciary functions of national
banks from the Federal Reserve Board to the Comptroller of the Currency, 12
U.S.C. § 92a(a) (1964).
012 C.F.R. § 9a8 (1969) (collective investment).
'Under the plan approved by the Comptroller pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 9.18
(1969) the Account is, with several notable exceptions, similar to an open-end
mutual investment fund. It is managed by FNCB as agent, pursuant to a manage-
ment agreement designating the customer as principal and conferring broad in-
vestment powers upon FNCB.
The customer, in exchange for a minimum deposit of $io,ooo, receives an
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with the mutual fund industry.
For this reason, Investment Company Institute8 (ICI) brought suit
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seek-
ing a declaratory judgment9 to invalidate certain of the regulations pro-
mulgated by the Comptroller10 on the ground that such regulations
permitted national banks to engage in an activity allegedly unautho-
rized and illegal under the Glass-Steagall Act.1 The district court
found that ICI was an implied beneficiary of congressional intent un-
der the Glass-Steagall Act and therefore had standing to challenge the
Comptroller's determination. On appeal the Comptroller asserted that
undivided interest in the commingled fund of the Account evidenced by "units
of participation." Such units may be redeemed at net asset value without imposi-
tion of any sales load or redemption charge, or they may be transferred to other
participants in the plan. The commingled fund of the Account, in turn, is in-
vested in securities, principally common stocks and convertible bonds, offering an
opportunity for income and long term capital growth.
FNCB is designated both as investment adviser and statutory underwriter
for the Account with a five-member Committee (not more than three of whom
are affiliated with FNCB) operating the Account and having powers similar to
those of a board of directors.
The Account differs from most open-end mutual funds, first, because the
securities of the Account can be marketed only to bank customers through the
trust department of the bank, rather than through the wide public distribution
channels normally utilized by underwriters of mutual fund issues. Second, com-
pensation to the bank may not exceed one-half of one percent per annum of the
average net asset value of the fund as contrasted with load or redemption charges
imposed by most mutual funds. Third, operation of the Account is subject to
the continuing supervision of the Comptroller.
The Account itself is registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. § 8oa-8 (1964), as an investment company and the units of participation
are registered under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1964).
The format of the plan of the Account accommodates two separate sets of
statutes inasmuch as it is designed to conform to the banking laws administered
by the Comptroller of the Currency as well as those statutes administered by the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
1ICl is an association of mutual funds and their advisers and underwriters.
OInvestment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 274 F. Supp. 624 (D.D.C. 1967).
In an action fied in the district court, ICI challenged the determination of
the Comptroller approving the plan of the Account and sought to enjoin FNCB's
operation of the Account. From an adverse decision in the district court the
Comptroller and FNCB appealed. Id. National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. had originally intervened in proceedings before the SEC to challenge exemp-
tions made to FNCB permitting operation of the Account under the Investment
Company Act of 1940. The association representing the securities dealers then
filed a petition in the court of appeals to review the order of the Commission
granting the exemptions. Both appeals were consolidated for decision in the
principal case. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., No. 20,164 (D.C. Cir., July i,
1969).
20ICI sought to invalidate so much of the regulation of the Comptroller as
permitted national banks to engage in operation of this type account. See gen-
erally 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1969).
1112 U.S.C. §§ 77, 378 (1964).
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ICI was without standing to maintain an action for judicial review of
his determination. 2
In order to reach the merits of the case it was first necessary for the
court of appeals to determine that ICI was a proper party to challenge
the action of the Comptroller. Although the district court's decision
granting standing based on ICI's status as an implied beneficiary of
congressional protection was rejected, standing was nevertheless grant-
ed. In a per curiam opinion, the majority of the court of appeals ex-
pressed reservations concerning the standing of ICI to challenge the
Comptroller but nevertheless, allowed it, in order to reach the merits.'3
First, there was ample evidence of factual aggrievance sufficient to
sharpen the issues and the controversy for a judicial determination,
inasmuch as bank competition permitted by the regulations allowing
the Account would have a considerable adverse economic effect on the
mutual fund industry.' 4 Second, a matter of great public interest was
involved in assuring proper administration of the Glass-Steagall Act.15
Third, the absence of any "aggrieved party" provision in the relevant
statute made it apparent that, as a practical matter, the mutual fund
industry was the only party likely to challenge the administrative ac-
tion of the Comptroller. A denial of standing would in effect afford
rulings of the Comptroller almost complete immunity from judicial
review when, as here, the Comptroller's ruling is favorable to the party
asking for it.16
Broadly speaking, the question of standing involves a determina-
tion of who may challenge administrative action.' 7 Traditionally, only
those parties showing an invasion of some legally protected right have
standing to seek judicial review of administrative action.' s Such legal
right may arise as the result of constitutional, statutory or common
law protection.' 9
"Brief for Camp at 16-28 and Reply Brief for Camp at 2-12, National Ass'n
of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, No. 2o,164 (D.C. Cir., July 1, 1969).
23This comment is concerned neither with the merits of the case nor with
the standing of National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. It deals solely with
the problem of ICI's standing to challenge the action of the Comptroller and to
challenge competition by FNCB.




'3 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.01 (1958).
'See generally Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 31o U.S. 113 (194o); Tennessee Elec.
Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S.
464 (1938).
10See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152-53 (1951)
(concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.)
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There is abundant authority for the proposition that competition
created by administrative action, without more, does not in and of it-
self confer standing on a party to challenge such action merely on the
basis of its administrative origin.2 0 Economic injury caused by lawful
competition is regarded as damnum absque injuria.21 Moreover, the
mere allegation that the activity causing economic injury is illegal or
unauthorized under a particular statute administered by an agency
does not confer the requisite standing on a party not intended to be
protected by the statute.22 The principal rule of standing is that it
focuses on the party seeking to bring his complaint before a federal
court and not on the issues he wishes to have the court adjudicate.23
In Pennsylvania Roalroad v. Dillon,24 Judge Burger, speaking for
the majority of the court, stated: "Allegation of a legally protected
right is a constitutional predicate of standing to attack governmental
action."25 The relevant inquiry goes, then, to the type of status a com-
plaining party must assert in order to gain standing.
One class of cases holds that a party has standing to challenge
agency action if there has been an invasion of his legal rights.2 6 Al-
though standing was denied in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA,
27
where private power companies sought to enjoin TVA from distribut-
ing power in areas where they held non-exclusive public utility fran-
chises from the state, the Supreme Court clearly stated the criteria
necessary to show an invasion of common law or statutory rights. The
Court said that the private power companies, threatened with direct
and special injury as the result of the action of a governmental agency,
had no standing to sue
2"Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 3o6 U.S. 118 (1939); Alabama Power Co.
v. Ickes, 3o2 U.S. 464 (1938); Rural Elec. Admin. v. Central La. Elec. Co., 354
F.2d 859 (5 th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 815 (1966); Kansas City Power & Light
Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
nAlabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938).
2Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Association of Data Processing Serv.
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 37 U.S.L.W.
3489 (June 24, 1969). In support of the conclusion that the Glass-Steagall Act was
not intended to protect the securities industry see 75 CONG. REc. 9913-14 (1932)
(remarks of Senator Bulkley).
"3Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
2335 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, American-Hawaiian S.S. Co. v. Dillon,
379 U.S. 945 (1964).
'5335 F.2d at 294.
2Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Frost
v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515 (1929); see Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 31o
U.S. 113 (1940); Edward Hines Yellow Pines Trustees v. United 'States, 263 U.S.
153 (1923); Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 1o5 U.S. 166 (1881); Doehla Greeting Cards,
Inc. v. Summerfield, 116 F. Supp. 68 (D.D.C. 1953).
2 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
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unless the right invaded is a legal right,-one of property, one
arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion,
or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege .... 28
A second class of cases confers standing on a party who can show
that he was an intended beneficiary under a particular statute or regu-
latory scheme.29 In Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,30 a private utility
company was granted standing as an intended beneficiary under a
provision of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 193331 prohibiting
TVA from expanding its authority outside certain geographical areas.
The theory allowing standing was that such statutory provisions re-
flected an intent on the part of Congress to protect certain competi-
tive interests. Recently, an association of insurance agents was granted
standing to challenge action by the Comptroller allowing national
banks to engage in the sale of insurance, an activity alleged to be un-
lawful or unauthorized under the Glass-Steagall Act,32 on the theory
that the association of insurance agents was the beneficiary of congres-
sional intent under the Glass-Steagall Act. The court in Wingate Corp.
v. Industrial National Bank33 granted standing to a data processing
firm on the ground that it was an intended statutory beneficiary under
the Bank Service Corporation Act.34 Moreover, state banks have gen-
erally been held to be intended beneficiaries under the Glass-Steagall
Act in the so-called "branch banking" cases. 35
A third class of cases affords a basis for standing where Congress
has provided in its legislative enactment that certain parties should
Mald. at 137-38.
-XVhere Congress has enacted some regulatory scheme as to a particular
industry, competitors have been granted standing as intended beneficiaries under
the statute. City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 537 U.S. 77 (1958) (railroad
was an intended beneficiary where statute regulated the number of market
entrants); Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924) (railroad was an intended
beneficiary where statute required equal treatment of competitors).
30390 U.S. 1 (1968).
-"§ 15d, 16 U.S.C. § 831n-4(a) (1964).
12Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Ind. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1oo (5 th Cir. 1968).
nArnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147 (ist Cir. ig6g), petition for cert.
filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3038 (U.S. June 11, 1969) (No. 225) (Wingate is consolidated
with Arnold Tours). Contra, Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837; (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. June
24, 1969) (No. 1246).
3§ 4, 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1964).
-Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 823 F.2d 29o
(D.C. Cir. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 379 U.S. 411 (1965); National Bank
v. Wayne Oakland Bank, 252 F.2d 537 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958);
Wisconsin Bankers Ass'n v. Robertson, igo F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 196o), aff'd, 294
F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 938 (196i); Commercial State Bank
v. Gidney, 174 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1959).
1970]
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have the right of judicial review of administrative action.36 In FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station,3 7 the Supreme Court noted that although
the Federal Communications Act did not insure freedom from com-
petition, a licensee could, nevertheless, have standing to challenge ad-
ministrative action under the "aggrieved party" provision of the Fed-
eral Communications Act.as Two years later in Scripps-Howard Radio,
Inc. v. FCC,3 9 the Court stressed the fact that a party claiming standing
under an aggrieved party provision had standing only as a representa-
tive of the public interest. A party claiming standing to assert his rights
in the public interest is, in reality, a private attorney general.
In Associated Industries v. Ickes,40 the court discussed the under-
lying concept of the private attorney general doctrine:
[Congress] can constitutionally authorize one of its own officials,
such as the Attorney General, to bring a proceeding to prevent
another official from acting in violation of his statutory powers;
for then an actual controversy exists, and the Attorney General
can properly be vested with authority, in such a controversy,
to vindicate the interest of the public or the government. In-
stead of designating the Attorney General, or some other public
officer, to bring such proceedings, Congress can constitutionally
enact a statute conferring on any non-official person... author-
ity to bring a suit to prevent action by an officer in violation of
his statutory powers; for then, in like manner, there is an actual
controversy, and there is nothing constitutionally prohibiting
Congress from empowering any person, official or not, to insti-
tute a proceeding involving such a controversy, even if the sole
purpose is to vindicate the public interest. Such persons, so au-
thorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals.4'
A party may claim standing under the aggrieved party provision of
a relevant statute as a private attorney general to vindicate the public
interest even though there is no property right involved.4 Thus, the
16E.g., National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 372 US.
246 (1963) (per curiam); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942);
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 3o9 U.S. 470 (1940).
"7309 U.S. 470 (1940).
TMrhe Communications Act of 1934 § 402(b), 47 US.C. § 402(b) (1964) pro-
vides in part:
Appeals may be taken... (i) By any applicant... whose application is
denied ... (6) By any other person who is aggrieved or whose interests are
adversely affected by any order of the Commission granting or denying
any application ....
0316 U.S. 4 (1942).
"0134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
41134 F.2d at 704.
-TCC v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. 239 (1943); FCC v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station, 3o9 U.S. 47o (1940).
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concept of private attorney general stresses vindication of the public
interest rather than any private legal right possessed by the party
whose standing is challenged.4 3 Under a provision requiring the party
to be adversely affected or aggrieved, the requirement for standing is
generally two-fold. First, the party must be adversely affected in fact,
and second, the factual aggrievance must be the result of action by the
agency charged with administration of the statute.4 4 In National Coal
Association v. FPC,45 where the Commission granted a certificate of
public convenience and necessity for construction of a gas transmission
pipe line, Judge Bazelon, speaking for the majority, held that a trade
association of fuel companies and the labor unions to which the em-
ployees of the fuel companies belonged, were sufficiently aggrieved by
the action of the Commission to maintain an action for judicial review
pursuant to the aggrieved party provision in the Natural Gas Act.4 6
However, where there is no aggrieved party provision or other statu-
tory aid to standing,47 courts have generally denied standing to a
party challenging administrative action which creates unauthorized
competition even where the public interest is involved.48
Independent of any traditional basis for standing, there is some
support for the proposition that aggrievance in fact is sufficient to con-
fer standing under section 1o6(a) of the Administrative Procedure
Act.49 The relevant portion of that statute now reads as follows:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action wzthin the mean-
ing of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.8 0
"American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 364 U.S. (196o); Transcon-
tinental Bus Sys., Ins. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 39o
U.S. 920 (1968); Mondakota Gas Co. v. FPC, 232 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 846 (1956). See also Rural Elec. Admin. v. Northern States Power Co.,
373 F.2d 686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967)-
"Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); FCC v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (194o).
'191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
8§ 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1964), provides in part: "Any party... aggrieved
by an order issued by the Commission ...may obtain a review of such order in
the court of appeals of the United States...."
'"There is no statutory aid to standing for aggrieved parties under applicable
banking laws. Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
"Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 3o6 U.S. 118 (1939); Alabama Power Co.
v. Ickes, 3o2 U.S. 464 (1938); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d
924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 US. 884 (1955).
"5 US.C. § 702 (Supp. IV, 1968); see American President Lines, Ltd. v. Federal
Maritime Bd., 112 F. Supp. 346 D.D.C. 1953); 3 K. DAvis, A)naNISrRATivE LAW
TRATiSE § 22.02 (1958).
c05 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV, 1968) (emphasis added).
1970]
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The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act, how-
ever, supports the conclusion that it was not intended to alter then
existing law on the question of standing by creating an entirely new
basis for standing to secure judicial review of administrative action.5 1
This conclusion is supported by at least one writer 2 as well as a nu-
merical majority of courts that have considered the point.5
An analysis of the status of ICI in National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers supports the conclusion that it cannot claim standing
within any of the categories previously discussed which are tradition-
ally recognized as conferring standing to secure judicial review of ad-
ministrative action. The operation of a competitive business does not
infringe upon or violate any property right of ICI, such as a license
or certificate of convenience issued by any regulatory authority; there
was no breach of contract inasmuch as no contract existed between
the parties; and the action of the Comptroller in permitting bank
operation of the Account cannot be said to have inflicted any tortious
injury on 131. For those reasons, ICI cannot claim standing on the
basis of an invasion of its legal rights.5 4
The legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act indicates that the
Act was directed toward protection of the bank depositor rather than
toward any protection or regulation of the securities industry.5 5 ICI,
therefore, cannot claim standing either as an express or an implied
beneficiary of the congressional scheme of protection in the Glass-
Steagall Act.
Although the competition generated by the action of the Comp-
troller caused aggrievance in fact due to the detrimental economic im-
pact upon members of ICI, it cannot claim standing as a private attor-
ney general inasmuch as the Glass-Steagall Act contained no aggrieved
party provision.56 Furthermore, the court rejected ICI's contention that
5S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 31o (1946); see 92 CONG. REc. 2158,
5654 (1946).
62L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACrION 528-30 (1965).
"Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 38
U.S.L.W. 3015 (U.S. May 19, 1969) (No. 1407, 1968 Term; renumbered No. 128,
1969 Term); Rural Elec. Admin. v. Northern States Power Co., 373 F.2d 686
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967); Braude v. Wirtz, 35o F.2d 702 (9th
Cir. 1965); Duba v. Schuetzle, 303 F.2d 57 o (8th Cir. 1962); Kansas City Power
& Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
Contra, American President Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 112 F. Supp. 346
(D.D.C. 1953).
r 4Cases cited note 25 supra.
ONational Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, No. 20,164 at 43 (D.C. Cir., July
1, 1969).
5Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 62 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
Chief Judge Bazelon, in his concurring opinion, said it was fortuitous that
